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need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry 
between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient 
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does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto 
dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities. 
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Should a society apt for a centralized ￿scal system under which spending decisions are
made by a central authority and ￿nanced from general tax revenues or should it apt for
a decentralized system in which ￿scal choices are made by local authorities and ￿nanced
by local taxes? In his seminal work on economic federalism, Oates (1972) answered
this question by highlighting a trade o⁄between internalization of externalities and the
capacity of the state to cater for regional di⁄erences in taste. His famous Decentral-
ization Theorem states that decentralization is desirable if externalities are weak and
regional di⁄erences in taste are large.1 Clearly such economic trade o⁄s are important,
yet the design of the ￿scal state has equally important political economy implications.
This is because political ine¢ ciencies are a⁄ected by the degree of centralization of the
￿scal state. This has been explored in a growing literature on the political economy of
￿scal federalism.2 This literature, which we discuss in more detail below, has identi￿ed
various political trade o⁄s as well as reasons why the economic trade o⁄s are a⁄ected
by politics. This paper makes a contribution to this literature by pointing to a new and
important political cost of centralization: governance uncertainty. It explores how gov-
ernance uncertainty a⁄ects the trade o⁄ between internalization of externalities under
centralization and the perceived bene￿ts of electoral accountability under decentraliza-
tion.
The general framework of our analysis is the common agency model with governance
uncertainty studied by Aidt and Dutta (2004). This model portrays a society populated
by heterogenous groups of voters (e.g., living in di⁄erent regions) with con￿ icting policy
preferences. The groups of voters (the principals) use elections to hold an opportunistic
or rent seeking politician (the agent) accountable for his policy choices while in o¢ ce.
They do so by voting retrospectively in an in￿nite sequence of elections, as in Ferejohn
1This result is, as pointed out by Besley and Coate (2004), driven by the somewhat arti￿cial assump-
tion that the federal government cannot tailor spending to regional di⁄erences in taste. See Harstad
(2007) for a rationale for why it might be politically optimal to select uniform federal policies.
2See, e.g., Seabright (1996); CrØmer and Palfrey (1996, 2000); Edwards and Keen (1996); Dixit
and Londregan (1998); Lockwood (2002, 2008); Luelfesman (2002); Besley and Coate (2003); Dur and
Roelfsema (2005); Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007); Bordignon et al. (2008); Fredriksson et al.
(2010).
2(1986), Persson et al. (1997) or Coate and Morris (1999). The critical new feature of the
analysis is that ex ante ￿before each election ￿the politician is uncertain about which
group will be pivotal in deciding the outcome of the election. We call this governance
uncertainty. Governance uncertainty has many di⁄erent sources, as we discuss in more
detail below. To be concrete, however, we relate it to random events that a⁄ect the
electoral turnout rate of voters in di⁄erent groups.3 These random turnout shocks,
which we assume to be correlated within groups but not between groups, introduce
uncertainty from the point of view of the politician as to which of group holds the
majority amongst those voters who actually turn out to vote in any given election.
An example of what we have in mind is random ￿ uctuations in weather conditions in
di⁄erent locations. As in Roemer (1998), such ￿ uctuations are to a ￿rst approximation
uncorrelated across regions and induce random turnouts in elections.
We adopt this general setting to revisit one of the classical questions of ￿scal federal-
ism: when should provision of local public goods be centralized? Our analysis highlights
a new political cost of centralization. This cost arises because turnout uncertainty is
more pronounced at the federal level than at the regional level. As a consequence, cen-
tralization may be associated with a loss of electoral accountability. The nature of this
loss, however, depends on the direction of the externality associated with provision of
local public goods. We identify an important asymmetry between situations with posi-
tive and negative externalities. With negative externalities, voters are forced to accept
more rent seeking in a centralized federation than when ￿scal decisions are decentralised
to the regions. Consequently, centralization entails a loss of accountability that must
be traded o⁄ against the bene￿ts of internalizing externalities. Centralization is only
Pareto e¢ cient if the (negative) externality is su¢ ciently strong. With positive exter-
nalities, on the other hand, centralization does not entail a loss of accountability per se.
Yet, even when the regions of the federation are identical in all respects, centralization
is not necessarily Pareto e¢ cient despite the presence of (positive) externalities.
The organization of the ￿scal state is not just a question of theoretical interest.
It is an issue of great practical importance as well. The ongoing debate about the
3See Dhillon and Peralta (2002) for a good survey of the literature on voter turnout.
3appropriate role of the European Union is just one example this. Another is the view
that a reorganization of the ￿scal state towards more a decentralized structure is one
very promising way to increase e¢ ciency and fairness in provision of public goods in less
developed countries (Santos (1998); Bardhan (2000)). Finally, the analysis can provide
insights into the forces that stabilize and destabilize federal ￿scal structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related
literature and put our contribution in context. In section 3, we present a general political
(common) agency model with governance uncertainty and introduce and discuss the
main assumptions. In section 4, we present the characterization results from Aidt and
Dutta (2004). We provide complete proofs in Appendix I. In section 5, we tailor the
general model to the case of local public goods and ￿scal federalism and present the
main results of the paper. In section 6, we discuss the implications of our analysis for
￿scal integration and disintegration. In section 7, we summarize and discuss a number
of extensions.
2 Related literature
The literature on the political economy of ￿scal federalism has been surveyed by, for
example, Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) and Lockwood (2006), and we shall only attempt
to cover the most direct links to our analysis here.
Our paper is most directly related to the work by Seabright (1996), Tommasi and
Weinschelbaum (2007), Bordignon et al. (2008) and Hindriks and Lockwood (2009).
Seabright (1996) argues that political accountability is weakened when public spending
decisions are centralized. He measures this e⁄ect as the reduction in the probability
that a given region can determine the re-election of the government. In our model, this
notion is made precise. The political clout of a region is determined by the probabil-
ity that voters of that region holds the majority among those who turn out to vote in
the federation. Importantly, whether the reduction, implied by centralization, in the
probability that a given region can determine the re-election of the government leads to
a loss of political accountability depends on the nature of the externalities associated
4with provision of local public goods, as discussed above. This is a new insight. Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum (2007) study the question of centralization versus decentralization
within the framework of a common agency model. They allow the principals (citizens
of the regions within the country) to o⁄er monetary rewards to either the federal politi-
cian (under centralization) or to the regional politicians (under decentralization). They
identify a trade o⁄ between internalization of externalities and the coordination failure
that arises among the principles when ￿scal decisions are centralized. One can interpret
the trade o⁄that we highlight in a similar way, but with two important di⁄erences. One
di⁄erence is that we focus on the implicit incentives that the threat of termination of
o¢ ce can provide rather than the explicit incentives provided by monetary payments.
Another di⁄erence is that we allow for positive as well as negative externalities and
show that this distinction matters in important ways for the nature of the coordination
failure. Bordignon et al. (2008) also ￿nd that the distinction between positive and
negative externalities matters within a lobbying model similar to that of Tommasi and
Weinschelbaum (2007). The reason is, however, very di⁄erent from the one highlighted
by our analysis. It has to do with the fact that lobbying under decentralization may
partly compensate for the fact that local public goods are under-provided, but only if
the externality is positive. Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) stress that voters are often
poorly informed about policy outcomes, not only in other districts but also in their own,
and that elections, in addition to their disciplining role, also serve as a selection devise.
As in our context, ￿scal centralization reduces electoral accountability, but this e⁄ect is
counteracted by a selection e⁄ect that encourages ￿bad￿incumbents to pretend to be
￿good￿ . Our analysis abstracts from the selection e⁄ects in order to stress the e⁄ect of
governance uncertainty on electoral accountability.
Our paper is also related to the works by Besley and Coate (2003), Dur and Roelfsema
(2005) and Lockwood (2002; 2008). Besley and Coate (2003) identify two important po-
litical e⁄ects of centralization. These are related to di⁄erent legislative procedures at
the federal level. First, centralization induces uncertainty as to whether or not the rep-
resentative from a particular region will be include in the minimum winning coalition
that determines policy. Second, when policy making at the federal level is determined
5by bargaining between representatives from di⁄erent regions, regional voters may have
an incentive to delegate strategically and elect a politician that cares a lot about public
spending. In both cases, a trade o⁄ between the political distortion (uncertainty or
strategic delegation) and the bene￿ts of internalizing (positive) externalities determines
whether or not centralization is bene￿cial. Besley and Coate ￿nd that centralization
is, typically, bene￿cial if the externality is strong enough. Dur and Roelfsema (2005),
however, extend this analysis to show that centralization may fail to internalize exter-
nalities if the cost of public policy cannot be shared among the regions. Luelfesmann
et al. (2008) furthermore argue that Besley and Coate (2003) underplay the scope for
bargaining amongst regions and show that decentralization tends to dominate central-
ization when this is taken into account.4 Like Besley and Coate (2003), we also focus
on the uncertainty that arises when ￿scal decisions are centralized, but we stress gover-
nance uncertainty rather than uncertainty about being included in the minimum winning
coalition. It is interesting to notice that decentralization, in our model, can only Pareto
dominate centralization in the presence of a negative externality ￿a case that Besley
and Coate (2003) do not consider.5 Moreover, while we do not allow bargaining among
regions, we do not allow this at the federal level either. This simpli￿cation allows us to
isolate the key political economy trade o⁄ in a simple and transparent way.
Lockwood (2002) argues that centralization leads to ine¢ cient outcomes when re-
gional representatives vote over agendas that contain sets of region-speci￿c projects. The
problem is that the political choice is not tailored su¢ ciently to within-region bene￿ts.
Thus, centralization entails a classical trade o⁄between catering for regional di⁄erences
and internalizing externalities. Importantly, however, the political distortions imply
that weaker externalities and heterogeneity between regions need not increase the e¢ -
ciency gain from decentralizations. In our model, there is no regional di⁄erences with
regard to the bene￿ts of public goods. Nonetheless, we ￿nd an interesting asymmetry
4A similar conclusion is reached by Cheikbossian (2000). He shows that with a decentralized ￿scal
structure voters strategically elect representatives to eliminate any element of cooperation between
representatives at the decision-making stage and that this tend to work against centralization. See also
Luelfesman (2002) who shows that with linear cost sharing rules decentralization typically is socially
optimal.
5Besley and Coate (2003) make welfare comparisons based on aggregate public goods surplus.
6between positive and negative externalities which provides a complementary example
of how politics can change the classical trade o⁄s in surprising ways. Lockwood (2008)
further explores ways in which the Decentralization Theorem may break down under
majority voting or lobbying even when federal policy is, by assumption, prevented from
re￿ ecting regional preferences.
3 A General Model of Governance Uncertainty
The starting point of our analysis is an in￿nite horizon model of repeated elections
and performance voting, familiar from Ferejohn (1986), Persson et al. (1997), Coate
and Morris (1999) and Aidt and Magris (2006) among others. We extend the standard
formulation of the model by introducing voter heterogeneity and governance uncertainty.
Society consists of two groups of voters, i = 1;2; politicians are indexed by 0. A group
is de￿ned as a subset of voters who are a⁄ected in the same way by public policy. Group
a¢ liation may be determined by observable characteristics such as age or gender, or by
shared preferences for public policy. In the context of ￿scal federalism, group a¢ liation
is naturally de￿ned along geographical lines and so we can think of the two groups as
representing two regions within a federation. Per-period utility, uit, is discounted with





tuit; i 2 f0;1;2g: (1)
There are n1 voters in group 1 and n2 voters in group 2. We assume that n1 ￿ n2. The
size of the total (voter) population is n = n1 + n2.
Each period, the politician collects taxes up to a maximum of T, spends some of this
on providing amenities to his electorate, and keeps the rest for himself.6 Denoting the
cost of providing utilities to the two groups of voters by ct, we can write the politician￿ s
per-period payo⁄ as
u0t = T ￿ ct (2)
6This formulation of the con￿ ict of interest between voters and politicians is due to Persson et al.
(1997) and used extensively in Persson and Tabellini (2000). It should be understood as a metaphor
for the more general phenomenon that politicians can divert their e⁄orts towards activities that are not
in the interests of their electorate.
7if in o¢ ce, and u0t = 0 otherwise.
The cost of providing utility to voters is determined by the political cost function.
We de￿ne C(x1t;x2t) as the minimum cost to the politician of providing utility levels
u1t ￿ x1t and u2t ￿ x2t simultaneously to voters in the two groups at time t. Likewise,
we de￿ne Ci(xit) as the minimum cost of providing the utility level uit ￿ xit to group i,
i = 1;2, in isolation. We begin by specifying the political cost function directly, but shall
derive it from more fundamental considerations in the application to ￿scal federalism
that follows. We make the following assumptions.




t ) C(xt) ￿ C(x0
t)
xit > x0
it ) Ci(xit) ￿ Ci(x0
it)
where xt = (x1t;x2t). Further, limxi!1 C(x1;x2) = limxi!1 Ci(xit) = 1.





The ￿rst assumption says that it is costly for the politician to generate utility for each
group of voters. This is clearly the case whenever tax resources that could otherwise have
been extracted as rents have to be devoted to the task. However, when the politician
can generate utilities by providing public goods, the cost functions may not be strictly
increasing. The second assumption rules out discontinuities in the cost of generating
utilities. Both of these assumptions can be relaxed.
The property of the political cost function that really matters for outcomes is whether
it is sub- or super-additive. The political cost function is sub-additive if
(C
+) C(x1t;x2t) ￿ C1(x1t) + C2(x2t) (3)
and super-additive if
(C
￿) C(x1t;x2t) > C1(x1t) + C2(x2t): (4)
8A sub-additive political cost function makes it cheaper to provide utility to all voters
jointly than to provide the same utility levels to the two groups separately. In public
￿nance, sub-additivity is, typically, associated with pure public goods or positive exter-
nalities. A super-additive cost function makes it more expensive to please all groups
of voters jointly than to please them separately. Super-additivity is caused by negative
externalities associated with, for example, provision of local public goods, pollution, or
with envy e⁄ects.
The politician, elected at t, cannot make binding promises on the level and pattern
of public spending before he enters o¢ ce. Since his own payo⁄ decreases with ct, he
would, in the absence of further incentives, choose ct = 0 and provide no amenities to the
electorate. Voters know this, and threaten to vote retrospectively against a politician
who does not provide them with a minimum level of utility. At the beginning of each
period, voters in each group announce simultaneously a performance standard, denoted
x1t and x2t. They then vote in favor of reelection of the incumbent politician if, and
only if the policy implementation observed at the end of the period generates at least
that level of utility, i.e., if, and only if uit ￿ xit.
The key feature of the model is that politicians are exposed to governance uncer-
tainty. At the most general level this means that the incumbent cannot be sure ex
ante which of the two groups is decisive in determining his reappointment. Governance
uncertainty can arise for many di⁄erent reasons. A leading example is electoral turnout
uncertainty, and this is the interpretation we shall follow here for concreteness. In partic-
ular, we generate governance uncertainty by assuming that neither group can guarantee
to turn out in full force at elections. Consequently, a politician may deliver on the
performance standard set by group 1, who, say, holds the majority ex ante, by incurring
the cost C1(x1t), but fail to deliver on the standard set by group 2 (u2t < x2t). On the
day of the election, ~ nit voters from group i actually show up to vote, and the politician
can lose his bid for reelection if ~ n2t > ~ n1t. The central assumption of our analysis is
that electoral turnout is uncertain, and that individual voters vote according to the
announced performance standards if they show up to vote, but that they cannot, as a
group, guarantee a particular turnout rate. This is captured by the next assumption.
9Assumption 3 Electoral turnout, ~ nt = (~ n1t; ~ n2t), is random. The ex ante probability
that the turnout of group 1 is greater than that of group 2, P(~ n1t ￿ ~ n2t), is equal to p1
and constant over time. The complementary probability is p2 = 1￿p1. We assume that
p1 2 (0;1).
Here, we specify the parameters p1 and p2 directly. Thye can be derived from more
basic considerations, however, and di⁄erent distributions of turnout shocks map into
alternative speci￿cations of p1 and p2. It is important that 0 < p1 < 1, so that neither
group can guarantee reelection. This is more likely to be the case when turnout shocks
are correlated within groups and and when di⁄erences in group sizes are not too large.
An example of this is weather shocks. These are typically uncorrelated across space and
can a⁄ect the turnout rate in particular geographical locations or keep certain types of
voters, such as the poor, at home (Roemer, 1998).
It is important to stress that governance uncertainty can arise for many other rea-
sons than turnout uncertainty in elections. It may, for example, re￿ ect ￿ uctuations
in inter-group power relations with one group becoming more powerful and therefore
more pivotal than another due to unpredictable events. The lobbying power of social
groups may well ￿ uctuate in this way. Under this interpretation, the probability of
being pivotal, pi, can be seen as a manifestation of randomness in the cost of political
mobilization. Combined with the insights from Olson (1965), a minority could be as
likely as a majority group to be pivotal, not because it may in fact hold the majority
among those who turn out to vote, but because it is better at organizing an e⁄ective
lobby group. Another example is random preferences. Suppose that some people like
education spending while others want spending on care for the elderly and that the
proportions of individuals of these two types ￿ uctuate in unpredictable ways. In this
case, pi represents the probability that one of the ￿preference types￿is pivotal.
The game between the incumbent politician and the two groups of voters unfolds
over time as follows. At the beginning of each period, voters in each group announce
the (utility) standard that the politician needs to satisfy to get their votes in the next
election. The standards are chosen by the two groups non-cooperatively and at the
same time. The politician observes the standards and determines whether to comply,
10and if so, how many standards to meet. We denote the set of actions available to
the politician by A = f(00);(10);(01);(11)g with elements at = (00) (meet neither
standard); at = (10) (meet group 1￿ s standard only); at = (01) (meet group 2￿ s standard
only); and at = (11) (meet both standards). At the end of the period, a new election
is held and voters randomly turn up to vote. Those who turn up vote according to the
announced performance standard. The politician either wins or loses. In the latter case,
he is replaced by an identical challenger; in the former case, he gets (at least) another
term in o¢ ce. After the election, the game continues to the next period where a similar
sequence of events takes place. We restrict attention to history-independent subgame
perfect Nash equilibria of this game.7 In addition, we assume that the politician, if
indi⁄erent between two or more actions (which are then preferred to the remaining
ones), chooses the action that maximizes reelection chances. Below, when we refer to
equilibrium this is what we have in mind.
4 Equilibrium Paths
We can apply Theorem 1 from Aidt and Dutta (2004) to characterize the set of equilibria.
The theorem, which we formally state and prove in Appendix I, says that all equilibrium
paths of the political game described above have a property called strategic consensus:
the politician prefers to meet all performance standards at all times, all those voters
who turn out to vote in the election vote for the incumbent, and the incumbent is
reelected with certainty, irrespective of turnout shocks. While this outcome, perhaps, is
to be expected when the political cost function is sub-additive and it is cheaper for the
politician to satisfy the standards jointly than separately, it is surprising that the same
result obtains with super-additive costs. In this case, the fact that it is more expensive
to satisfy the standards jointly than separately suggests that ￿partisan￿outcomes would
be more likely. This intuition is, however, wrong. To see why, consider the special case
7Formally, the model describes a dynamic common agency game with absorbing states and perfect
information. The two groups of voters are principals, and the elected politician their common agent.
Uncertainty in rewards arises from uncertainty about which of the two principals will have the ￿casting
vote￿ , or ￿nal say, in the only reward available: re-election. There is no aggregate uncertainty, as one
of the principals will have the casting vote for sure.
11where the only policy instrument is a group-speci￿c transfer. This makes the political
cost function additive. To please voters, the politician must either be partisan and give
transfers to one group only or seek consensus and give to both. The two groups of
voters set their standards simultaneously. Suppose that group 1 announces a standard
that is so high that the politician prefers to take his chances and o⁄er transfers only to
group 2. This cannot be an equilibrium. This is because group 1 gets nothing and it
would do better by reducing its standard to a level such that it is in the best interest
of the politician to o⁄er it a transfer. In other words, whenever the politician is willing
to implement a ￿partisan￿outcome, the disfavored group has an incentive to lower its
standard to induce the politician to make a ￿partisan￿choice in its favor. This logic
continues until the standards are such that the politician is just willing to implement
a policy that satis￿es both groups. The result is strategic consensus. Importantly, it
does not follow from this logic that the two groups will ￿under-bid￿each other until
the politician captures the entire rent. This would only happen if the two groups were
￿perfect substitutes￿in the sense that either of them can guarantee reelection for sure
(see Ferejohn, 1986). In our model, however, the two groups of voters avoid Bertrand-
style competition precisely because they are not ￿perfect substitutes￿from the point
of view of the politician: the consent of both is needed to secure the reelection reward
with certainty. As a consequence, voters retain some control power, even when political
costs are additive. A similar logic applies when the political cost function is either sub-
or super-additive.
Although all equilibrium paths display strategic consensus, the distribution of payo⁄s
depends critically on the properties of the political cost function. Let X = fx1t;x2tg1
t=0
be a sequence of equilibrium performance standards. In an economy with sub-additive
political costs, the following characterization result holds. We provide a formal proof in
Appendix I.
Proposition 1 (Sub-additive Costs) If the political cost functions satisfy assump-
tions [M] and [K] and are sub-additive, then X must satisfy
(SC
+
1) C(x1t;x2t) = ￿T;
12(SC
+
2) C1(x1t) ￿ ￿p1T;
(SC
+





3) hold with equality for additive political cost functions.
Along all equilibrium paths, the politician receives payo⁄s (1 ￿ ￿)T per period.
The proposition explores the fact that the politician must, at equilibrium, be indif-
ferent between satisfying both and satisfying none of the standards. As a consequence,
the politician always gets per period payo⁄ (1 ￿ ￿)T, while the remaining share of tax
revenues, ￿T, is devoted to the task of generating utilities to voters. Importantly, this
distribution of resources is una⁄ected by turnout uncertainty. Thus, strategic consensus
provides the politician with ￿full insurance￿ against random voter turnout and vot-
ers with insurance against ￿partisan￿choices by the politician. When the political cost
function is additive, the allocation of utility between the two groups of voters is uniquely
determined by p1 and p2. In contrast, economies with strictly sub-additive costs exhibit
multiple equilibria in performance standards at each t, and any equilibrium allocation
what arises with sub-additive costs (weakly) Pareto dominates the utility allocation with
additive costs.
In an economy with super-additive political costs, the utility allocation is very dif-
ferent, as shown by the second characterization result (see Appendix I for a proof).
Proposition 2 (Super-additive Costs) If the political cost functions satisfy assump-
tions [M] and [K] and are super-additive, then X must satisfy
(SC
￿
1 ) C(x1;x2)(1 + ￿1) ￿ C1(x1) = ￿1T
(SC
￿
2 ) C(x1;x2)(1 + ￿2) ￿ C2(x2) = ￿2T
where ￿i =
(1￿pi)￿
1￿￿ for i = 1;2. The politician receives payo⁄s T ￿C(x1;x2) > (1￿￿)T
every period. Moreover, if the cost functions are di⁄erentiable and @C
@x1@x2 > 0, then the
solution to (SC
￿
1 ) and (SC
￿
2 ) is unique.
In this case, the politician must, at equilibrium, be indi⁄erent between satisfying
both standards and satisfying just one of them. The politician receives T ￿ C(x1;x2)
13each period. This is more that he receives along any equilibrium path with sub-additive
costs, but the payo⁄ is no longer independent of turnout shocks. Intuitively, super-
additive costs make it costly for the politician to implement consensus outcomes. This
enables him to extract more rents: the two groups of voters have, ceteris paribus, to
lower their standards to prevent ￿partisan￿outcomes.
In the next section, we tailor the general model to the case of ￿scal federalism. We
identify the two groups of voters with voters living in di⁄erent regions of a country and
argue that governance uncertainty generated by turnout shocks is more pronounced at
the federal than at the regional level.
5 Fiscal Federalism
We consider a country with two regions, i = 1;2. This corresponds to the two groups
in the general model. The two regions can be of di⁄erent sizes, with ni voters living
in region i. We suppose that n1 ￿ n2. The regions may also di⁄er with regard to tax
potential and electoral turnout patterns. Individuals in each region derive utility from
local public goods git and private goods yit. Consumption of local public goods in one
region generates externalities for individuals in the other region. To capture this, we
write the utility function of a typical individual living in region i as
uit = yit + git ￿ ￿g￿it (5)
where ￿ 2 (￿1;
n2
n1) captures the strength of the externality. ￿ > 0 corresponds to a








where kit is an input required to produce the public good, bought at a constant price
of one. For simplicity, we assume that ￿ = 1
2.8 The maximum revenue that can be
raised each period in region i is Ti, and so the maximum revenue that can be raised in
8This assumption can be relaxed, but doing so yields no additional insights and complicates the
mathematical exposition.
14the country is T = T1 + T2. We use the convention that politicians raise the maximum
revenue each period, spent some of it on providing local public goods, some on transfers
sit > 0 to individuals, and keep the rest as rents.
We compare two institutional arrangements: Regionalism [R] and federalism [F].
Regionalism means that each region elects its own politician who can ￿nance local
public goods (and transfers) out of local tax revenues. Federalism means that a single
elected politician is in charge of the whole country and can use general tax revenues to
provide public goods and transfers to the two regions.9
The key assumption of the application is that turnout uncertainty is more pro-
nounced at the federal than at the regional level. This assumption can be justi￿ed in
many ways. Most importantly, the federal politician must, by de￿nition, cater to more
principals than each of the regional politicians. In particular, the federal politician needs
the support of the majority of the whole country while a regional politician only needs
the majority support of his own region. Turnout shocks at the regional level renders
regional turnout unpredictable. Consequently, the federal politician faces an additional
layer of uncertainty that is not present in regional elections. To make the contrast as
sharp as possible, we assume that regional politicians can guarantee reelection if they
satisfy the performance standard set by voters in their region: there is no turnout un-
certainty within a region. In contrast to the two regional politicians, the politician in
charge of the federation is exposed to turnout uncertainty and needs the support of
voters in both regions to get reelected for sure. We denote the ex ante probability that
voters in region i holds the majority among those who turn out to vote by pi with
p1 = 1 ￿ p2. Again, it is important to stress that turnout uncertainty is not the only
valid interpretation of pi. For example, pi can also be interpreted as a power index
that captures the in￿ uence of region i in federal decisions. All regions may be pivotal
occasionally because of random shifts in power relations, but some regimes are more
likely to be pivotal than others.
9This formulation rules out cooperation among regions in regime [R]. In some cases, this could be
important, although high transaction costs typically rule such cooperation out in practice.
155.1 The Benevolent Planner￿ s Solution
As a benchmark, suppose that all public ￿nance decisions were made by benevolent
planners. When ￿scal decisions are decentralized to the regional level, two regional
planners decide independently and simultaneously how much local public good to pro-
vide to their region. They do so by maximizing regional aggregate public goods surplus









￿it) ￿ kit, i = 1;2: (7)
In a federation, on the other hand, decisions are made by one benevolent planner who




it(:). It is easy to verify that federalism under these ideal circumstances Pareto
denominates regionalism for all ￿ 6= 0.10 The intuition is straight forward. Rent seeking
is not an issue with benevolent planners, so the level of centralization does not create
or eliminate political distortions. Moreover, federal and regional planners are equality
good at catering to local tastes. Hence, the only concern is to internalize externalities.
This provides a clear-cut benchmark against which we can measure political distortions.
5.2 The Political Cost Functions
To characterize equilibrium allocations, we need to derive the political cost functions.
This is done in Appendix II. In the following, we focus on the situation in which both
federal and regional politicians provide local public goods and transfers at equilibrium.
This basically requires that tax resources are su¢ ciently large in each region and in the
federal as a whole.11
10For ￿ = 0, the institutional arrangement makes no di⁄erence.
11Necessary conditions that guarantee that politicians, at equilibrium, provide local public goods and
transfers in all regimes are: Ti >
(ni)
2


















1 + ￿2 (1 + ￿pi)
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￿ 4￿￿n1n2pi + n2




See Appendix II for details.
16Under regionalism, the two regional politicians face a separate performance standard.
They make decisions about public spending without (direct) regard for the welfare of
voters in the other region, i.e., each politician takes the spending decisions by the other
politician as given. Consider the politician in region i who in period t faces the perfor-
mance standard xit. The minimum cost of satisfying this standard for a given input to
the production of local public goods in the other region is
C(xit;k￿i) = min
kit￿0;sit￿0
kit + nisit (8)






￿it and the regional budget constraint. It follows that
kit = (ni)
2 and sit = xit ￿ 2(ni ￿ ￿n￿i). The political cost functions are
C
R
i (xit) = (ni)
2 + ni(xit ￿ 2(ni ￿ ￿n￿i)) for i = 1;2: (9)
We notice that the externality is not internalized: both regions spend on local public
goods up to the point where the regional marginal bene￿t is equal to the marginal cost.
The transfer must, therefore, ￿compensate￿regional voters for the impact of spending
on local public goods in the other region. In each region, voters set the performance
standard in period t taking the standard of the other region as given. At equilibrium,
the standards are set to make each regional politician indi⁄erent between satisfying
the standard and getting reelected (for sure) and not satisfying it, in case of which he







￿ ni + 2(ni ￿ ￿n￿i) for i = 1;2: (10)
The politician of region i keeps a share (1 ￿ ￿)Ti of regional tax revenues each period,
and uses the rest to provide local public goods and transfers to voters of his region. A
negative externality reduces voters￿welfare (￿ > 0), while a positive externality (￿ < 0)
enhances their well-being, as one would expect.
Under federalism, decision making power rests with a single elected politician who
faces the performance standards fx1t;x2tg set by voters in the two regions each pe-
riod. The politician minimizes the cost of satisfying the two standards jointly by
17spending kit = (ni ￿ n￿i￿)
2 on local public goods and by providing transfers sit =
xit ￿ 2ni (1 + ￿2) + 4￿n￿i to voters in each of the two regions. The political cost func-
tion is therefore given by
C
F(x1t;x2t) = (n1 ￿ n2￿)


















If the politician decides to satisfy the standard of one of the regions, say, region i,
only, then it is clear that s￿it = 0. However, if local public goods generate a positive
externality, it is cost e⁄ective to provide some local public goods to region ￿i: not
because the politician cares about the welfare of voters in that region as such, but
because it is, up to a point, cheaper to provide utility to voters in region i this way
than to give them transfers. Hence, for ￿ < 0, the cost minimizing choice of spending
on local public goods is kit = (ni)
2 and k￿it = (ni￿)
2 and the transfer to each voter of
group i is xit ￿ 2ni(1 + ￿2). If, on the other hand, local public goods generate negative
externalities, then k￿it = 0 minimizes political costs and the politician spends kit = (ni)
2
on local public goods to region i and provides the voters of that region with the transfer
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2 + ni(xit ￿ 2ni(1 + ￿
2)) for ￿ < 0: (13)






i (xit) = 4n2n1￿ < 0; (14)














) > 0: (15)
The political cost function is sub-additive for ￿ < 0 and additive for ￿ = 0. For ￿ > 0,










n1 > 0for n1 ￿ n2.
18Below we apply propositions 1 and 2 to characterize stationary equilibrium alloca-
tions. Our main goal is to compare regime [F] and [R] under di⁄erent assumptions about
the magnitude of the externality. We use Pareto e¢ ciency as our welfare criterion. In
doing so, we adopt a citizens-centric approach and exclude the rents captured by the
politicians. That is, we say that regime [F] Pareto dominates [R] if all voters prefer [F]
to [R]. This approach has several advantages. Firstly, Besley and Coate (2003) propose
to use aggregate public goods surplus to evaluate the costs and bene￿ts of centralization.
We prefer the Pareto criterion because it, in contrast to a criterion based on aggregate
public goods surplus, has a clear-cut positive implication: if one institutional arrange-
ment Pareto dominates another, all voters would support a change in the institutional
arrangement if the decision to change was put to a vote in, e.g., a referendum (as in
CrØmer and Palfrey (1996)). Secondly, the citizens-centric approach has the advantage
that the comparisons are not distorted by whether politicians can extract more or less
rents. Since the rents are pure social waste in our model, this seems a reasonable choice
from a normative point of view. However, from a positive point of view, it is interesting
also to study how regional politicians, who may have a disproportionate say in whether
centralization takes place or not, rank the di⁄erent regimes, and we do so in section 6.
5.3 No Externality
To set the stage, we begin by considering the case in which there is no externality. In
this case, political costs are additive and the total rent ((1 ￿ ￿)T) captured by the
federal politician corresponds precisely to the sum of those captured by the two regional
politicians ((1 ￿ ￿)T1 + (1 ￿ ￿)T2). An implication, then, is that the only e⁄ect of
centralization is to allow redistribution between the two regions: with additive costs,
centralization is a zero-sum game and if one region gains it must be at the expense of
the other. Consequently, the two regimes cannot be Pareto ranked.
Proposition 3 (No externality ￿ = 0) Regime [F] and [R] cannot be Pareto ranked.




for i = 1;2:







+ ni for i = 1;2:







i ￿ (Tpi ￿ Ti) = n
￿1
i ￿(piT￿i ￿ p￿iTi) ￿ b ￿i for i = 1;2: (16)
where xR
it is de￿ned by equation (10). The proposition follows immediately from the
fact that b ￿1 > 0 , b ￿2 < 0
Individuals in region i receives
pi￿T
ni + ni from the federal government and
￿Ti
ni + ni
from the regional government. Intuitively, therefore, whether a region gains or loses from
centralization depends on pi ￿the probability that each region holds the majority among
those who turn out to vote in the federal election ￿relative to the region￿ s contribution
to federal tax revenues. An implication, then, is that poor regions are, ceteris paribus,
more likely to favor centralization than rich regions. For given tax resources, the size of
the region as such does not matter for the costs and bene￿ts of centralization. However,
if the tax resources are, say, proportional to the population size of a region, i.e., Ti = niIi
where Ii is per capita income of region i, then size becomes a consideration. Supposing,
for example, that Ii = I￿i and pi = p￿i, then region i bene￿ts from federal redistribution
if and only if it is smaller than region ￿i. In other words, in the absence of externalities,
centralization tends to be favored by small and poor regions and/or by regions that are
likely to be pivotal in federal decision making.
5.4 Negative Externalities
The situation is more complex and interesting when local public goods generate a neg-
ative externality (￿ > 0) and political costs become super-additive. In this case, cen-
tralization is associated with three e⁄ects. The ￿rst e⁄ect is the redistribution e⁄ect
described above: centralization pools revenues from the two regions and thus allows re-
distribution to take place. The second e⁄ect is the internalization e⁄ect: centralization
induces the federal politician to internalize the externality in order to minimize the cost
20of getting reelected. This bene￿ts all voters. The third e⁄ect is the rent e⁄ect. The rent
e⁄ect arises because political costs are super-additive. Recall from proposition 2 that
the federal politician￿ s share of total revenues, at equilibrium, is larger than (1 ￿ ￿)T.
This implies that less is available in total to generate amenities to voters in the federa-
tion than in the two regions separately. This harms all voters. In the next proposition,
we isolate the externality and rent e⁄ect from the redistribution e⁄ect by assuming that
p1 = 1
2 and that T1 = T2.
Proposition 4 (Negative Externalities ￿ > 0) Let ￿ =
n1
n2 ￿ 1. Assume that p1 = 1
2
and T1 = T2. Then for ￿ >
(1+￿)(￿￿1)
2(3￿2￿1)
1. [R] is Pareto superior to [F] for ￿ 2 (0;
4(1￿￿)￿
(2￿￿)(1+￿2)).




Proof. Using proposition 2 and equations (11) and (12), we can derive the (unique)





i + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿pi)
￿
￿n2
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it = b ￿i +
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i + n2
￿i) ￿ 2nin￿i(1 ￿ 2￿pi)
￿
ni
for i = 1;2;
where b ￿i is de￿ned in equation (16). For p1 = 1















We note that ￿it ￿ 0 , ￿￿it ￿ 0. In particular, ￿it < 0 for i = 1;2 for ￿ 2
(0;
4(1￿￿)￿








￿1 , ￿ >
(1+￿)(￿￿1)
2(3￿2￿1)
The proposition shows that centralization is e¢ cient only with strong negative exter-
nalities. This is in contrast to the social planner￿ s solution which showed that central-
ization is a Pareto improvement for all ￿ > 0. The result, however, echoes the classical
21￿nding by Oates (1972), although the logic is entirely di⁄erent. While Oates focused
on the trade o⁄ between internalizing externalities and catering for di⁄erences in the
preference for public goods in di⁄erent regions, the trade o⁄ behind proposition 4 has
nothing to do with heterogenous taste: it is driven by the rent e⁄ect. Centralization
implies a transfer of resources from voters in the two regions to the federal politician.
For weak externalities, both regions are, for that reason, worse o⁄in a federation. How-
ever, for ￿ >
4(1￿￿)￿
(2￿￿)(1+￿2), the externality e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong to dominate the
rent e⁄ect, and federalism Pareto dominates regionalism. It is interesting to notice that
this threshold is decreasing in ￿. This means that two unequally sized regions are more
likely to bene￿t from joining a federation than two equal-sized regions. The reason is
that it is relatively expensive for a regional politician to compensate his voters through
transfers for any un-internalized externalities when the two regions are of unequal size.
Proposition 4 ignores the redistribution e⁄ect which, as we noted above, is driven
by turnout uncertainty as captured by pi and di⁄erences in tax resources in the two
regions. Taking this e⁄ect into account, we can de￿ne the values of p1 for which the two
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1 + n2
2) ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ 2￿)n1n2






T2. Region 1 prefers regime [F] to [R] if, and only if p1 > p1
1(￿;￿) and region
2 prefers regime [F] to [R] if, and only if p1 < p2
1(￿;￿). The two functions, p1
1(￿;￿) and
p2
1(￿;￿), are drawn in Figure 1 in (￿;p1) space for a given value of ￿. We can identify
two main areas: in area 1 regime [R] is Pareto superior to [F], while in area 2, regime [F]
Pareto dominates [R]. Outside these areas, the distribution e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong to
make one of the regions better o⁄ at the expense of the other. An increase in ￿ (which
makes region 1 relatively richer) shifts p1
1(￿;￿) and p2
1(￿;￿) up making it less likely that
region 1 and more likely that region 2 bene￿ts from federalism.
22Figure 1: Welfare analysis with super-additive political costs.
5.5 Positive Externalities
The situation in which local public goods generate positive externalities is very di⁄erent.
In this case, political costs are sub-additive and proposition 1 shows that there exists
multiple equilibria under federalism. Along all equilibrium paths, the aggregate utility
of the two regions is, however, uniquely determined by













Moreover, the lower bounds on the utility provided to each region is given by xi ￿
1
ni (￿piT + n2
i (1 + ￿2)) for i = 1;2. The federal politician collects the rent (1 ￿ ￿)T
each period. This is the same as the total rent collected by the two regional politicians:
there is no rent e⁄ect with sub-additive costs. In the absence, then, of signi￿cant
redistribution e⁄ects (i.e., for p1 = 1
2, T1 = T2), one might expect that centralization is
always a Pareto improvement. The next proposition shows that this is not the case. To
state the result, we denote the share of total utility that goes to region 1 by ’. This
allows us to index equilibrium allocations by ’. We also, for simplicity and without loss
of any important insights, assume that n1 = n2 = 1. This this case ’ =
x1t
￿T+2(1￿￿)2.
Proposition 5 (Positive externalities ￿ < 0) Assume that p1 = 1
2, T1 = T2 and
n1 = n2 = 1. Then there exists a ’ 2 (0; 1
2) such that for ’ 2 [’;1 ￿ ’] regime [F]
Pareto dominates regime [R].
23Proof. Using proposition 1, we can calculate the ￿best￿and the ￿worst￿equilibrium
allocation for each region under regime [F]:
x
max




it = ￿piT + 1 + ￿
2





it = b ￿i + ￿
2 + 2￿ < 0;





it = b ￿i + ￿
2 ￿ 2￿ > 0;
where b ￿i is de￿ned in equation (16). For p1 = 1





it > 0 for i = 1;2. Thus, at least one region prefers [F] to [R]. Along any
equilibrium path
x1t + x2t = ￿T + 2(1 ￿ ￿)
2:
De￿ne the share of total utility obtained by region i by ’i. Region i is then indi⁄erent
between the two regimes for
’i =
￿Ti + 1 ￿ 2￿
￿T + 2(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ ’i:
Note that for T1 = T2, 0 < ’1 < 1 ￿ ’2 < 1 and that ’1 = ’2 < 1
2. Since
P
i ’i = 1, we
conclude that for ’1 2 (’1;1￿’2) both regions prefer [F] to [R]. Substitution of ’1 = ’
and ’1 = ’ yields the proposition
Corollary 1 For p1 = 1
2, T1 = T2, n1 = n2 = 1 and ￿ < 0, there exist equilibrium
allocations for which centralization is not a Pareto improvement.
The proposition shows that federalism Pareto dominates regionalism in some, but
not all, equilibria. In the absence of the rent and redistribution e⁄ect, it is surprising
that centralization is not always e¢ cient. Why is it not better for all voters to allow
internalization of the external bene￿ts? The reason is that the selection of equilibria,
24Figure 2: Utility allocations with sub-additive political costs.
in fact, re-opens the door to redistribution, but now redistribution is driven by the se-
lection of equilibria, rather than by di⁄erences in pi and Ti as such. For example, in
the ￿worst￿equilibrium under regime [F], the external bene￿t captured by region 1 is
￿2 which is less that what it ￿receives￿under [R], namely ￿2￿. The point is that in
this equilibrium most of the bene￿ts from having the positive externality internalized
are captured by region 2 and region 1 is better o⁄ with the ￿external￿bene￿ts unin-
tentionally bestowed on it by region 2 under regionalism. This ￿and the proposition
more generally ￿is illustrated in Figure 2. The Figure shows the utility allocations
attainable in the federation under the assumptions of the proposition. The segment
A ￿ B indicated with bold on the utility frontier contains the equilibrium allocations
that Pareto dominate regionalism (represented by point R). The remaining allocation
on the frontier cannot be Pareto ranked. In these cases, contrary to the Decentraliza-
tion Theorem, it is not e¢ cient to centralize despite the fact that there are no regional
di⁄erences in neither taste nor income, but there are (positive) externalities to be inter-
nalized. An implication of this, then, is that regionalism cannot ever Pareto dominate
federalism with positive externalities. This stands in sharp contrast to the case with
negative externalities discussed above.
256 Fiscal Integration and Disintegration
Logically, ￿scal integration among otherwise independent regions or countries must ei-
ther be fully voluntary or forced upon reluctant regions by more powerful neighbors.
Voluntary integration leads to a stable ￿scal structure, while the end result of forced
integration must be considered unstable with a tendency to break down over time. Lead-
ing examples of the former include Switzerland, where the independent Cantons in 1848
agreed to form a federation, and the United States in the formative years. As an ex-
ample of the latter one may point to the United Kingdom. England has traditionally
played the leading role within the Union, but over the years her power has gradually
been curtailed, ￿rst, by Ireland seceding in 1921, and more recently by the push to
devolve power to Wales and Scotland. Our analysis can speak directly to the forces that
create and destroy federations.12
In the absence of strong externalities (and economies of scale), federations are simply
vehicles for redistribution and must be forced in one way or the other. Federal struc-
tures are, typically, supported by small, relatively poor regions that stand gain from
integration and opposed by rich and populous regions that stand to lose. Of course, if
the rich and populous regions are su¢ ciently powerful (in the sense of being more likely
to be pivotal in federal decision making), this preference ordering may be reversed, but
it remains that, in the absence of externalities, federalism cannot be based on consensus.
As a consequence, federations born in this context are likely to be unstable with regions
continuously trying to secede.
Voluntary formation of a federation, then, as in Oates (1972), requires strong ex-
ternalities. Our analysis suggests that the logic leading to the formation of a stable
federation di⁄ers signi￿cantly depending on whether externalities are predominately
negative or positive. With negative externalities, the strength of the externality is the
key driver of integration: a strong negative externality makes all regions favor a fed-
eration and accept the loss of accountability that comes with it. But heterogenous
population sizes also play a role. In fact, federations are more likely to form among
12See Alesina and Spolaore (1997) for analysis of the state formation.
26regions of di⁄erent sizes than among equal-sized regions. Surprisingly, a strong positive
externality is not su¢ cient to make federalism the preferred organization structure of the
￿scal state. The reason is that turnout uncertainty opens up the door for redistribution
through equilibrium selection even among otherwise symmetric regions. Depending on
the distributional outcome some regions may lose out and veto integration even when
externalities are strong or, if they are already in the federation, attempt to secede.
We have so far taken a citizens-centric approach and ignored the interests of the
regional politicians when making regime comparisons. In practice, however, regional
politicians may have disproportionate in￿ uence on integration decisions and be able
to supersede the interests of the voters they represent. To consider this possibility,
suppose that the ￿scal architecture of the country is decided by consent of the two
regional politicians irrespective of what voters want and that each perceives that there
is a probability qi, with
P
i qi = 1, that he will become the ￿federal politician￿ .13 Given
that, centralization cannot be voluntary if the externality is (weakly) positive. The
reason is that the total rent that can be extracted by the federal politician is equal to
the sum of the rents extracted by the two regional politicians. As a consequence, one of
them will lose, in expectation, by agreeing to a federation. With negative externalities,
the situation is very di⁄erent. Recall that the aggregate rent that can be extracted by
the federal politician is greater than the sum of the rents extracted by the two regional
politicians. This implies that federalism may be preferred to regionalism by all regional
politicians. To see this, suppose that the two regions are symmetric with pi = 1
2,
n1 = n2 = 1and T1 = T2 = 1
2T. In this case, the rent collected by the federal politician
is:14
R
F = (1 ￿ ￿)T + 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿): (20)
The politician of region i prefers federalism to regionalism if qiRF > 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)T. Then,
for q1 such that
q1 > q1 > 1 ￿ q1 (21)
13If they do not have any chance of becoming the federal politician, they will veto any attempt at
centralization since they will lose their rents.
14See Appendix III for details.
27both politicians prefer [F] to [R] where
q1 =
1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)T + 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)





The threshold q1 is increasing in the strength of the externality. Hence, the two regional
politicians are most likely to consent to a federation if externalities are strong, not
because they have any interest in internalizing these externalities, but because they can
extract extra rents from voters in this case. Combined with proposition 4, this provides
a very strong positive prediction: in the presence of strong negative externalities, all
voters and all politicians support a federation.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper revisits the classical question about whether ￿scal decisions should be cen-
tralized or decentralized. We show how governance uncertainty ￿exempli￿ed by turnout
uncertainty ￿a⁄ects the trade o⁄ between internalization of externalities and political
accountability. We highlight a novel asymmetry between positive and negative external-
ities and show that centralization only weakens political accountability in the presence
of negative externalities. We also show that in the presence of positive externalities
centralization may not be Pareto e¢ cient despite the fact that policy can be tailored
to regional tastes and centralization internalizes regional spillover e⁄ects. These results,
however, ignore a potentially important bene￿t of decentralization, namely yardstick
competition. As shown by Besley and Case (1995), voters can make comparisons be-
tween jurisdictions and use information about what is happening in other jurisdictions
to overcome political agency problems. This forces incumbents into (yardstick) compe-
tition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing. This bene￿t is, of
course, lost if ￿scal decisions are centralized. It would be interesting in future research
to extent the analysis to include the possibility of yardstick competition.
More generally, the paper explores the consequences of turnout uncertainty in a
political agency model with repeated elections, retrospective voting, and heterogenous
voters. The general framework and the characterization results in Aidt and Dutta
28(2004) can be adopted to many other applications than the one studied here. This
includes other public ￿nance problems, e.g., the choice between targeted transfers and
universal public goods (see Aidt and Dutta (2010)), but applications in many other
￿elds, including corporate governance and labor economics, also come to mind.
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8 Appendix I
To prove the main characterization results, we must ￿rst prove that all equilibria exhibits
strategic consensus. We begin by introducing some extra notation. Let x￿i(xi) be the
level of utility group ￿i obtains when the politician provides utility level xi to groupi
at minimum cost without regard to the welfare of group ￿i. Then, the following is true:
[B1] C(x1t;x2t (x1t)) = C1 (x1t)
[B2] C(x1t (x2t);x1t) = C2 (x2t):
A special case of this is when C(x1t;0) = C1 (x1t) and C(0;x2t) = C2 (x2t) as assumed
in Aidt and Dutta (2004). We also assume that C(0;0) = Ci(0) = 0; i = 1;2. We can
now state the main Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Strategic Consensus) Assume that ￿ 2 (0;1). Let xt = (x1t;x2t) be a
pair of performance standards set by the two groups of voters for period t and de￿ne
X = fxtg1
t=0 as a sequence of such standards. Let a￿
t be the action implemented by the
politician in period t; de￿ne V0t(at) as the politician￿ s payo⁄.
1. A stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
2. Suppose (M), (K) and (C+) hold. Along any stationary equilibrium path, X
satis￿es
(SC
+) V0t(11) = V0t(00) ￿ maxfV0t(10);V0t(01)g:
Any sequence X satisfying (SC
+) is a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in performance standards. Along any stationary equilibrium path, the politician
chooses a￿
t = (11) at every t and he is reelected for sure.
3. Suppose (M), (K) and (C￿) hold. Along any stationary equilibrium path, X
satis￿es
(SC
￿) V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) > V0t(00):
Any sequence X satisfying (SC
￿) is a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in performance standards. Along any stationary equilibrium path, the politician
chooses a￿
t = (11) at every t and he is reelected for sure.
Corollary 2 Every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium path displays strategic
consensus at each t.
31We prove the Theorem with a series of Lemmas. We begin by introducing some
notation. Denote for each action at 2 A, the politician￿ s payo⁄ by V0t(at) and write
V0t(00) = T; (23)
V0t(10) = T ￿ C1(x1t) + p1￿Vt+1; (24)
V0t(01) = T ￿ C2(x2t) + p2￿Vt+1; (25)
V0t(11) = T ￿ C(x1t;x2t) + ￿Vt+1: (26)
where Vt+1 > 0 is the value of being reelected at time t + 1. Note that the politician is
only reelected with some probability (p1 or p2) if he chooses to be ￿partisan￿and satisfy
one of the standards only.
Now, suppose, in some period t, that the two groups of voters announce the standards
xt = fx1t;x2tg. Given these standards, the politician chooses an action from the set
fat 2 A : argmaxat2A V0t(at)g. If the politician is indi⁄erent between two or more
actions in this set, he chooses the action that maximizes reelection chances. This is
anticipated by the two groups of voters when they, simultaneously, set their standards
at the beginning of the period. With these preliminary remarks we can state the ￿rst
Lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that [M] and [K] hold. If the performance standards xt = fx1t;x2tg
constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at time t, then xt must satisfy
(E0) V0t(11) ￿ maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g:
Proof: We argue by contradiction. Suppose that e xt = fe x1t;e x2tg constitutes a
stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in performance standards and that
V0t(11) < maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g
at time t. There are four separate cases to consider. We show in each case that at
least one of the two groups of voters has an incentive to deviate from e xt, leading to the
required contradiction.
1. Suppose that
V0t(10) = maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g > V0t(11)
or that
V0t(10) = V0t(00) = maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g > V0t(11):
Rewrite (24) and (26) to get
V0t(10) ￿ V0t(11) = C(x1t;x2t) ￿ C1(x1t) ￿ p2￿Vt+1:
By [M] and [K], property [B1] implies that there must exist a x0
2t > x2t such that
C(e x1t;x
0
2t) ￿ C1(e x1t) ￿ p2￿Vt+1 < 0:
This implies that group 2 can gain by announcing the standard x0
2t instead of e x2t.
322. Suppose instead that
V0t(01) = maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g > V0t(11)
or that
V0t(01) = V0t(00) = maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g > V0t(11):
By an argument similar to the previous case, there must exist a x0




1t;e x2t) ￿ C2(e x2t) ￿ p1￿Vt+1 < 0:
This implies that group 1 can gain by announcing the standard x0
1t instead of e x1t.
3. Suppose that
V0t(00) = maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g > V0t(11):
Rewrite equations (23) and (24) to get
V0t(00) ￿ V0t(10) = C(x1t;x2t) ￿ p1￿Vt+1:
By [M] and [K] there must exist a x00
1t > 0 such that
C(x
00
1t;x2t) ￿ p1￿Vt+1 < 0:
This implies that group 1 can at least gain x00
1t > 0 by announcing the standard
x00
1t instead of e x1t. A similar argument can be made for group 2.
4. Suppose that
V0t(10) = V0t(01) = maxfV0t(10);V0t(01);V0t(00)g > V0t(11)
or
V0t(10) = V0t(01) = V0t(00) > V0t(11):
We need to consider two sub-cases. First, suppose the politician chooses at = (10).
We can then repeat the argument from case 1 to show that there exists a deviation
for group 2. Second, suppose the politician chooses at = (01). We can then repeat
the argument from case 2 to show that there exists a deviation for group 1.
Lemma 2 A pair of performance standards xt = (x1t;x2t) is a stationary subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium at time t if, and only if
(E1) V0t(11) = maxfV0t(01);V0t(00)g;
(E2) V0t(11) = maxfV0t(10);V0t(00)g:
Proof: Suppose that p1 ￿ 1
2. The per-period payo⁄ of group 1 is
u1t = x1t if maxfV0t(11);V0t(10)g ￿ maxfV0t(01);V0t(00)g;
u1t = x1t otherwise:
33The per-period payo⁄ of group 2 is
u2t = x2t if
8
> > > <
> > > :
V0t(11) ￿ maxfV0t(10);V0t(00);V0t(01)g
V0t(01) > maxfV0t(10);V0t(00);V0t(11)g
V0t(01) = V0t(00) > maxfV0t(10);V0t(11)g
;
u2t = x2t otherwise:
Recall that C(x1t;x2t) and Ci(xit) are monotonically increasing in their arguments by
[M]. Suppose that e xt is a (stationary subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium. Then, by
Lemma 1, (E0) is satis￿ed by e xt. It follows that the payo⁄ of group 1 is maximized
by the standard, x1t, that satis￿es (E1), and that the payo⁄ of group 2 is maximized
by the standard, x2t, that satis￿es (E2). Finally, notice that if (E1) and (E2) are
satis￿ed by a set of performance standards at time t, then these standards constitute
a stationary subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. This completes the proof for the case
with p1 ￿ 1
2. The proof for the case where p1 < 1
2 is similar and is omitted￿




Lemma 3 Conditions (E1), (E2), and (C
+) hold at t if, and only if
V0t(11) = V0t(00) ￿ maxfV0t(10);V0t(01)g:
Proof: Note that (C+) implies that
(C0
+) V0t(11) + V0t(00) ￿ V0t(10) + V0t(01)




+) to get that
V0t(00) ￿ V0t(01):
Combing this with (E1) yields
V0t(11) ￿ V0t(00):
This is a contradiction, so V0t(11) cannot be greater than V0t(00). It follows directly
from (E1) that V0t(11) cannot be smaller than V0t(00). Finally, V0t(11) = V0t(00)
is compatible with (C0
+), (E1), and (E2) only if V0t(10) ￿ V0t(00) and V0t(01) ￿
V0t(00)￿
The next Lemma considers the case of super-additive costs.
Lemma 4 Conditions (E1), (E2), and (C
￿) hold at t if, and only if
V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) > V0t(00):
34Proof: Note that (C￿) implies that
(C0
￿) V0t(11) + V0t(00) < V0t(10) + V0t(01)
at any t. We begin by proving that V0t(11) = V0t(10). This is done by contradiction.
First, suppose that V0t(11) > V0t(10). (E2) implies that
V0t(00) > V0t(10):
Combining this with (C0
￿) implies that
V0t(11) < V0t(01):
However, (E1) implies that V0t(11) ￿ V0t(01). This is a contradiction, so V0t(11) cannot
be greater than V0t(10). Second, suppose that V0t(10) > V0t(11). (E2) implies that
V0t(11) ￿ V0t(10);
This is a contradiction, and so V0t(10) cannot be greater than V0t(11). We conclude
that V0t(10) = V0t(11). The proof that V0t(01) = V0t(11) is similar and omitted. Finally,
V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) is compatible with (C0
￿) only if V0t(11) = V0t(10) =
V0t(01) > V0t(00)￿
The last Lemma establishes that a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists.
Lemma 5 A stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for ￿ 2 (0;1).
Proof: Suppose ￿rst that (C+) holds. In this case, a stationary equilibrium ^ x =
f^ x1; ^ x2g satis￿es (SC
+) at every t. This implies





T ￿ C1(^ x1)
(1 ￿ p1￿)
;
T ￿ C2(^ x2)
(1 ￿ p2￿)
]:
Equation (27) rewrites as
C(^ x1; ^ x2) = ￿T:
Equilibrium levels of ^ x satisfy









It follows from conditions (C+), (M) and (K) that there exists a solution to equations
(28) and (29).
Suppose instead that (C￿) holds. In this case, a stationary equilibrium ￿ x = f￿ x1; ￿ x2g
must satisfy
T ￿ C(￿ x1; ￿ x2)
1 ￿ ￿
=




T ￿ C(￿ x1; ￿ x2)
1 ￿ ￿
=




T ￿ C(￿ x1; ￿ x2)
1 ￿ ￿
> T: (32)
De￿ne the quantities x11;x12;x21;x22 as solutions to equations (30) and (31) when x1 =























Solving these equations yields





whenever ￿ 2 (0;1). It follows that a solution to equations (30) and (31) exists.
Additionally, if ￿ x satis￿es equations (30) and (31) then restriction (32) holds for all
￿ 2 (0;1). To show that an equilibrium exists for all ￿ 2 (0;1), rewrite (30) and (31) as
T￿ = (1 + ￿)C(￿ x1; ￿ x2) ￿ C(￿ x1;x2);
T￿ = (1 + ￿)C(￿ x1; ￿ x2) ￿ C(x1; ￿ x2);
where ￿ =
p2￿
1￿￿ and ￿ =
p1￿
1￿￿. Adding the two equations, we obtain
(￿ + ￿)(T ￿ C(￿ x1; ￿ x2)) ￿ C(￿ x1; ￿ x2) = C(￿ x1; ￿ x2) ￿ C(￿ x1;x2) ￿ C(x1; ￿ x2) > 0 (33)
by [C-]. Note also that ￿ + ￿ =
￿
1￿￿ and that (33) implies
C(￿ x1; ￿ x2) < ￿T
as assumed￿
Based on this fundamental result, it is relatively straight forward to prove proposi-
tions 1 and 2.
Proof of proposition 1. The value of reelection starting from any period t is
V0t = max[V0t(01);V0t(10);V0t(11);V0t(00)]. We obtain from Lemma 3 and equation
(23) that V0t = V0t(00) = T. This implies that
V0t+1 = T:
36We obtain, from Theorem 1 and equations (23) to (26), that
V0t(11) = V0t(00) ) C(x1t;x2t) = ￿T;
and that
V0t(00) ￿ V0t(10) ) C1(x1t) ￿ ￿p1T;
V0t(00) ￿ V0t(01) ) C2(x2t) ￿ ￿p2T:
The politician￿ s per period payo⁄ is T ￿ C(x1t;x2t) = (1 ￿ ￿)T. Moreover, suppose
C(x1t;x2t) = C1(x1t) + C2(x2t). Then, there exist a unique stationary equilibrium,
x1t = x￿








Proof of proposition 2. The value of reelection starting from any period t is V0t =
max[V0t(01);V0t(10);V0t(11);V0t(00)]. We obtain from Lemma 4 that V0t = V0t(11) for






For sequences of stationary standards, we get




Substituting for V0t+1 =
T￿C(x1;x2)
1￿￿ , we get that









1￿￿ for all t implies that the politician gets T ￿ C(x1;x2) per
period. This is strictly greater than (1 ￿ ￿)T because V0t(11) > V0t(00) by Lemma 4.
For uniqueness, see proposition 3 in Aidt and Dutta (2004)￿
9 Appendix II
In this appendix, we derive the political cost function under federalism. Suppose the
politician wants to satisfy both regions. He, then, solves the following problem each
period (where we have omitted subscript t for simplicity):
min
k1;k2;s1;s2
















Under the assumption that ￿ <
n2
n1, k1 and k2 are (weakly) positive at the optimum. It
is useful to distinguish between four cases:
371. s1 > 0, s2 > 0
2. s1 = s2 = 0
3. s1 = 0, s2 > 0
4. s1 > 0, s2 = 0
Case 1: Substituting the two constraints, which must be binding at the optimum,
















Solving this, we get k1 = (n1 ￿ n2￿)
2 and k 2 = (n2 ￿ n1￿)
2. The per capita transfers
are










Notice that si > 0 requires that xi > 2ni (1 + ￿2)￿4￿n￿i. The political cost function is
C (x1;x2) = (n1 ￿ n2￿)


















Case 2: This case applies for x1 ￿ n1 (1 + ￿2) ￿ 2￿n2 and x2 ￿ n2 (1 + ￿2) ￿ 2￿n1. We








￿￿ or ￿ < 0 and minfx1;x2g > 0. Then, both constraints are binding and we can solve
them to get the lowest spending level on the two local public goods that will generate























Notice that C (0;0) = 0. Secondly, suppose that the constraint for group 1 is not









for x1 ￿ ￿￿x2:


















1 ￿ = 0






























for x1 < 0:
Third, suppose that the constraint for group 2 is not binding. By analogy we get for









for x2 ￿ ￿￿x1:





for x2 < 0:
Case 3: Substituting s2 out from the beginning, we can write the Lagrange function
as
























1 ￿  k
￿1
2




2 +  ￿k
￿1
2




1 + 2 k
1
2
2 = 0 (36)
Solve equations (34) and (35) to get
k1 = (  ￿ n2￿)
2
k2 = (n2 ￿ ￿ )
2 :
39Substitute this in equation (36) and solve for  :



























2n2 (1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿x1
2(1 + ￿2)
￿2
s2 = x2 ￿ 2
￿





x1 + 2￿n2 (1 ￿ ￿2)
2(1 + ￿2)
￿
and the political cost function is
C (x1;x2) =
￿





















We notice that s2 > 0 requires that x2 >
2(n2(1￿2￿2+￿4)￿￿x1)
(1+￿2) . For x1 ￿ 4￿n2,   = 0.









For ￿ ￿ 0, k1 = 0 and k2 = (n2)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1;x2) = (n2)
2 + n2 (x2 ￿ 2n2):
For ￿ < 0, k2 = (n2)
2 and k1 = (￿n2)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1;x2) = (n2)
2 (1 + ￿
2) + n2
￿
























x1 + 2￿n1 (1 ￿ ￿2)
2(1 + ￿2)
￿2
s1 = x1 ￿ 2
￿





x2 + 2￿n1 (1 ￿ ￿2)
2(1 + ￿2)
￿
40and the political cost function is
C (x1;x2) =
￿





















We notice that s1 > 0 requires that x1 >
2(n1(1￿2￿2+￿4)￿￿x2)
(1+￿2) . For x2 ￿ 4￿n1,   = 0.
For ￿ ￿ 0, k2 = 0 and k1 = (n1)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1;x2) = (n1)
2 + n1 (x1 ￿ 2n1):
For ￿ < 0, k1 = (n1)
2 and k2 = (￿n1)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1;x2) = (n1)
2 (1 + ￿
2) + n1
￿




Now, suppose that the politician will only try to satisfy the demands of group i.
There are two cases to consider:
1. si > 0.
2. si = 0.
Case 1: The politician solves
min
ki;k￿i;si
ki + k￿i + nisi






￿i. The optimal choice is
ki = (ni)
2 and k￿i = 0 for ￿ ￿ 0
and
ki = (ni)
2 and k￿i = (ni￿)






xi ￿ 2ni for ￿ ￿ 0
xi ￿ 2ni(1 + ￿2) for ￿ < 0






2 + ni(xi ￿ 2ni) for ￿ ￿ 0
(1 + ￿2)(ni)
2 + ni(xi ￿ 2ni(1 + ￿2)) for ￿ < 0
:
Notice that for ￿ ￿ 0, xi > 2ni for si > 0 and for ￿ < 0, xi > ni2(1 + ￿2) for si > 0.
Case 2: First, if ￿ ￿ 0, then ki =
￿xi
2





for x￿i ￿ ￿￿xi:




















￿i ￿ = 0:































for xi < 0:
In the text, we focus on the case where, at equilibrium, the politician o⁄ers local
public goods and transfers. This requires that tax revenues are su¢ ciently large. More
speci￿cally, it requires the following.
1. Under [R], each regional politician spends ki = (ni)
2 and xit ￿ 2ni + 2￿n￿i on






￿ ni + 2(ni ￿ ￿n￿i).
Substitute this into the expression for the transfer and note that si > 0requires
that Ti >
(ni)2
￿ for i = 1;2.
2. Under [F], two cases can arise. For ￿ ￿ 0, we can, using proposition 2, write the





1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿p1)(￿n2







2 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿p2)(￿n2



















i (1 + ￿2 (1 + ￿pi)) ￿ 4￿￿n1n2pi + n2









2 + ni(xi ￿ 2ni(1 + ￿
2)) = ￿piT:
Solving this yields xit = 1
ni (T￿pi + n2

































i (1 + ￿2 (1 + ￿pi)) ￿ 4￿￿n1n2pi + n2





The rent, RF, extracted by the federal politician is T ￿ C(xF
1 ;xF
2 ) where C(xF
1 ;xF
2 )is






￿T + 1 + 2￿(1 ￿
1
2
￿)(￿ ￿ 2) for i = 1;2: (37)
Substitution yields equation (20). A comparison yields that q1RF > 1




2 (1 ￿ ￿)T
RF (38)
and that (1 ￿ q1)RF > 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)T if and only if
q1 < 1 ￿
1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)T
RF : (39)
Substitution of RF into equation (39) yields q1. We notice that q1 > 1
2 because
1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)T + 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)






(T + 4￿ ￿ 2￿2)
> 0. (40)






(T + 4￿ ￿ 2￿2)
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